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This paper describes radiofrequency (RF) electromagnetic field (EMF) measurements in the vicinity of 
single and banks of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) smart meters. The measurements were 
performed in a meter testing and distribution facility as well as in-situ at five urban locations. The 
measurements consisted of gauging the RF environment at the place of assessment, evaluating the worst-
case electric-field levels at various positions around the assessed AMI meter configuration (spatial 
assessment), which ranged from a single meter to a bank of 81 meters, and calculating the duty cycle of 
the system, i.e. the fraction of time that the AMI meters were actually transmitting (12-hour temporal 
assessment). Both in-situ and in the meter facility, the maximum field levels at 0.3 m from the meter 
configurations were 10–13 V/m for a single meter and 18–38 V/m for meter banks with 20 to 81 meters. 
Furthermore, 6-minute average duty cycles of 0.01% (one meter) up to 13% (81-meter bank) were 
observed. Next, two general statistical models (one for a single meter and one for a meter bank) were 
constructed to predict the electric-field strength as a function of distance to any configuration of the 
assessed AMI meters. For all scenarios, the measured exposure levels (at a minimum distance of 0.3 m) 
were well below the maximum permissible exposure limits issued by the International Commission on 
Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP), the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
and the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). Indeed, the worst-case time-average 
exposure level at a distance of 0.3 m from an AMI installation was 5.39% of the FCC/IEEE and 9.43% 
of the ICNIRP reference levels.  
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1.  Introduction 
The introduction of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) technologies into electric company service 
territories in the United States (US) has spurred public concern about exposure to the radiofrequency 
(RF) electromagnetic fields (EMF) of AMI, also known as “smart meters.” In collaboration with electric 
companies, the US Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, USA) performed 
characterizations of RF-EMF from smart meters in 2011 to respond to queries from the general public 
about RF-EMF exposures and upcoming smart meter rollouts (Foster and Tell, 2013; Tell et al., 2012; 
2013). In the last few years, smart meter exposure assessments were also carried out in Australia 
(Girnara et al., 2011), Belgium (Aerts et al., 2019), Great Britain (Peyman et al., 2017; Calderon et al., 
2019), and Spain (de Miguel-Bilbao et al., 2017).  
In general, a smart meter can represent a node in three types of networks: a home area network (HAN), 
a neighborhood area network (NAN), and a wide area network (WAN). In a WAN, devices transmit 
data directly to the utility. WAN devices are also called collectors, access points, or gateways. A NAN 
consists of multiple devices (spread over a number of residences), that may be interconnected in a mesh 
network, of which the data are sent to a WAN gateway. And finally, in a HAN, several devices in the 
same residence (e.g. in-home displays, communications hubs, gas meters, electricity meters, and water 
meters) are interconnected (wired or wirelessly) while one of them transmits the combined meter 
readings to a collector (which makes it part of a NAN) or directly to the utility (which makes it part of 
a WAN). Depending on the type of network, different wireless technologies for data transmission can 
be used. In previous studies, this included ZigBee at 2.4 GHz in a HAN (Peyman et al., 2017; Calderon 
et al., 2019), Mesh Radio in the Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) 915 MHz band (902–928 MHz) 
in a NAN (Girnara et al., 2011; Foster and Tell, 2013; Tell et al., 2012; 2013), Worldwide 
Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) at 2.3 GHz in a NAN (Girnara et al., 2011), and 
cellular technologies such as Long Term Evolution (LTE) (de Miguel-Bilbao et al., 2017) and General 
Packet Radio Service (GPRS) in a WAN (Aerts et al., 2019). 
Despite previous efforts, specific concerns about RF-EMF have been raised by people living in urban 
environments. These areas have higher population densities and more people living in close proximity 
to one another than the less urban areas assessed in previous studies. Moreover, actual long-term 
measurements of AMI transmissions and accurate evaluations of the exposure to multiple-meter 
configurations (meter banks) in NANs, as often present in these environments, are currently lacking. 
This paper describes the RF exposure assessment performed for various configurations of AMI smart 
meters operating in the ISM 915 MHz band in urban environments in New York City and Westchester 
County, New York. Through previous work, a protocol was developed for the evaluation of exposure to 
residential, potentially non-continuous RF sources (Aerts et al., 2019). Besides characterization of the 
RF environment, this protocol comprises two separate measurements: (a) (worst-case) exposure level 
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measurements – to assess the maximum electric field strength at certain positions in relation to the source 
(i.e. spatial assessment); and (b) duty cycle (DC) measurements – to determine the frequency and 
duration of the RF transmissions (i.e. temporal assessment). Both measurements are combined to obtain 
the time-averaged exposure levels, which were then compared to maximum permissible exposure 
guidelines issued by the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP, 
1998), the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC, 1997), and the Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineers (IEEE, 2005). It was concluded that for all assessed AMI smart meter scenarios, 
the measured exposure levels (as close to the meter configuration as 0.3 m were well below the 
maximum permissible exposure limits issued by ICNIRP, the FCC, and IEEE.  
The measurements described in this paper were carried out in a smart meter testing and distribution 
facility, to evaluate and streamline the measurement procedure, and in five diverse urban environments. 
The novel methods presented in this paper include: (i) a general exposure evaluation procedure for smart 
meters, which includes (ii) assessing both spatial and temporal exposure levels and measuring the real-
duty cycle, (iii) the in-situ assessment of multiple meter banks, (iv) a statistical exposure-distance model 
for rapid exposure predictions, and (v) the comparison of the potential exposures to smart meters and 
meter banks with the exposures to other residential sources of RF-EMF (Aerts et al., 2019). This study 
further serves to provide much-needed information on potential RF exposures in residential locations in 
the framework of large-scale AMI rollouts in areas with dense populations.  
2.  Materials and methods 
2.1. Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
The AMI smart meters under test were of the type Aclara I-210+cn (with network interface card NIC-
511) (www.aclara.com, Aclara Technologies LLC, St. Louis, MO, USA). As part of local mesh 
networks provided by Silver Spring Networks (https://www.itron.com/na/, San Jose, CA, USA), the 
assessed Aclara smart meters operated in the US unlicensed Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) 
915 MHz band (902–928 MHz). The assessed smart meters used the frequency-hopping spread 
spectrum (FHSS) transmission method with 83 300-kHz-spaced channels in its “default” configuration. 
The Aclara I-210+cn has a nominal peak power of 1 W (30 dBm). It should be noted that this device is 
similar to the ones assessed by Girnara et al. (2011), Foster and Tell (2013), and Tell et al. (2012, 2013). 
In a mesh network (NAN), smart meters at customer locations (also called “end-point” meters) transmit 
(and also relay) electrical usage data to a collection or access point (i.e. a WAN gateway) that 
communicates wirelessly to the central network of the utility company, usually via a mobile telephone 
network. The rate at which smart meters transmit data to the network’s access point is controlled by the 
meter read-out transmission interval (TI), typically 15 min for household customers, not including any 
intermediate or end-point-to-end-point (relay) communications. 
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2.2. Measurement locations and smart meter (bank) configurations 
The first phase of the measurements took place in a smart-meter testing and distribution facility (“meter 
shop”) and consisted of the assessment of a single AMI meter and two multiple meter configurations 
(meter banks) comprising 24 and 48 smart meters. The second phase involved in-situ measurements at 
five locations in diverse urban settings, which featured two single smart meters in semi-detached houses 
and three different meter bank configurations (20, 48, and 81 meters) in apartment complexes (Table 1). 
All measurements were performed in New York City and Westchester County, New York in 2018. 
Table 1: Characteristics of the five in-situ measurement sites (and the present AMI meter configurations) in New York 
City and Westchester County, New York. 
Site Building type 
Measurement 
location 
AMI meter configuration & location 
IS #1 Semi-detached house Basement Single meter; corner of basement 
IS #2 Detached house Exterior – ground 
level 
Single meter; on exterior (garage) wall 
IS #3 Low-rise apartment 
building 
Basement 46-meter bank; 5 x 10 meter arrangement, with two empty 
meter slots and two automated meter reading (AMR) 
devices 
IS #4 High-rise apartment 
complex 
5th floor hallway  20-meter bank; 5 x 4 meter arrangement in a cabinet with 
metal sliding door, accessible from hallway 
IS #5 Low-rise apartment 
building 
Basement Combination of a 48- (4 x 12) meter bank and a 33- (4 x 9, 
three empty meter slots) meter bank on opposite sides of 
the room 
 
In the meter shop, two identical configurations were constructed. Each consisted of 24 smart meters 
built in a 4-foot-by-6-foot grid, with standard meter spacing (center-to-center distance: 10” or 25.4 cm), 
on a hardwood panel mounted on a movable cart (Figure 1). Each meter could be powered on/off via 
toggle switches. Three setups were considered for the measurements: a single-meter setup (MS #1), a 
24-meter setup (MS #2), and a 48-meter setup (MS #3).  For the meter shop measurements, the read-out 




Figure 1: 24 AMI meters (type Aclara I-210+cn, NIC-511) attached to hardwood panel and mounted on a movable 
cart for easy configuration. Each row, column, or individual meter could be powered on/off. 
2.3. Exposure assessment 
The measurement equipment used in this study consisted of a signal and spectrum analyzer (SA) of type 
Rohde & Schwarz (www.rohde-schwarz.com, R&S, Munich, Germany) FSV30 with a frequency range 
of 10 Hz to 30 GHz combined with an isotropic tri-axial antenna (also called a “probe”) of type R&S 
TS-EMF-B1 (Figure 2). The probe contains electronically switched, orthogonally arranged antenna 
elements with a frequency range of 30 MHz to 3 GHz and a dynamic measurement range of 1 mV/m to 
100 V/m (Aerts et al., 2019). The expanded measurement uncertainty is ± 3 dB for the considered setup 
(CENELEC 2008; Joseph et al. 2012a). This uncertainty represents the expanded uncertainty evaluated 
using a confidence interval of 95%. 
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Figure 2: Measurement setup consisting of a Rohde & Schwarz FSV30 signal and spectrum analyzer (SA), connected 
to a laptop with Matlab software, combined with an R&S TS-EMF-B1 isotropic tri-axial antenna. 
A flowchart of the procedure to assess the exposure to AMI smart meters is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Flowchart of the procedure to assess the exposure to AMI smart meters. 
First, overview measurements of both a wide frequency range (between 30 MHz and 3 GHz) and the 
AMI frequency range (902–928 MHz) were performed at one position near the meter configuration 
(Figure 3). These measurements identified the RF environment at the measurement location and verified 
the transmission configuration of the smart meter(s). The SA was used in frequency mode, and the 
settings included a resolution bandwidth (RBW) of 1 MHz and 300 kHz (to differentiate between the 
channels used by the AMI transmission technology), respectively, and a sweep time (SWT) for the 
wideband and in-band measurement of 32 ms and 2.5 ms, respectively. In both cases, the total 
measurement time was 45 s (i.e. 15 s per [x, y, z] electric-field component). 
Step 1) Identification of RF environment
Step 2) Spatial measurements of worst-case exposure levels
Step 3) Temporal measurement to obtain duty cycle
Step 4) Calculation of time-averaged exposure levels and 
comparison to exposure guidelines
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Next, worst-case spatial exposure level measurements were performed at various positions around the 
AMI configuration. For this type of measurement, the zero-span mode of the SA was used, capturing 
the peak power (using the peak detector) transmitted within the 902–928 MHz band (CF = 915 MHz, 
RBW = 28 MHz), every 0.25 ms (at a SWT of 500 ms per 2001 sweep points). Each electric-field 
component was measured consecutively for a minimum time of the typical read-out TI (i.e. >15 min for 
the default household setting and >5 min for the meter shop measurements). During post-processing, 
the maximum field levels per component (Ei,max, with i = x, y, z) were retrieved and the total maximum 
electric-field strength (Emax) was calculated as the vector sum. Emax can be considered the exposure level 
in case of a continuous transmission of the AMI meters under test (i.e. at a DC of 100%); hence, it is the 
worst-case, and in practice unrealistic, exposure level. 
The (worst-case) electric-field strength E was also modelled as a function of distance d using a 
generalized log-distance model, based on the free-space path loss model of (Friis, 1946), written as 
follows, 
log10 𝐸 =  log10 𝐸(𝑑0) − n log10
𝑑
𝑑0
 ,   (Eq. 1) 
with n the model parameter to be fitted (in free space, n = 1) and E(d0) the electric-field strength at d = d0 
(e.g. 0.3 m). Although the electric-field strength is inversely proportional to the distance to the source 
(1/d), a generalized model was preferred because 1/d holds only for a single emitter in free space (Friis, 
1946). 
Third, a 12-hour temporal measurement was performed at one position near the AMI meter 
configuration under assessment (e.g. at a distance of 0.3 m) to obtain the DC and its variability over 
time. Since only the variation in time of the emitted signals was of interest, a single electric-field 
component (i.e. the most dominant, based on the spatial measurements) was sufficient to measure. As 
before, the power in the AMI frequency band was measured in zero-span mode and sampled every 
1.87 ms, fast enough to capture the shortest transmissions (i.e. ~2 ms for the specific AMI transmission 
technology (Tell et al., 2013)). During post-processing, a background power level was determined and 
the DC was calculated as the ratio of the number of power samples above this threshold to the total 
number of samples. Depending on the specific compliance assessment, a certain time-averaging window 
was applied (i.e. x min, with x = 6 for ICNIRP (1998) and x = 30 for FCC (1997) and IEEE (2005)). 
Lastly, time-averaged exposure levels were obtained using the maximum field levels and the (guideline 
X-specific) time-averaged DC (Verloock et al., 2010), calculated as  
𝐸𝑎𝑣𝑔,𝑋 = √𝐷𝐶x-min 𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥  [V m⁄ ].    (Eq. 2) 
This value was then compared to exposure-limiting guidelines by calculating the exposure ratio 
(ICNIRP, 1998), 
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 [%],    (Eq. 3) 
with Eref,X the guideline-specific reference level for the electric-field strength at the considered 
frequency, i.e. 41 V/m (ICNIRP, 1998) and 47.6–48.3 V/m (FCC, 1997; IEEE, 2005) for frequencies 
between 902 MHz and 928 MHz. The observed time-averaged exposure levels were well below the 
ICNIRP, FCC, and IEEE maximum permissible exposure guidelines if R ≤ 1. 
3.  Results and Discussion 
3.1. Overview measurements 
Figure 4 shows that a multitude of RF signals could be present at a measurement location (in this case, 
at site IS #2). Most often they were identified as cellular telecommunications signals (e.g. Global System 
for Mobile Communications (GSM), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), and Long-Term 
Evolution (LTE)), operating in a variety of frequency bands between roughly 300 MHz and 3500 MHz. 
Other signals observed included Wireless Fidelity (Wi-Fi), television and radio broadcasting, weather 
radar, and signals in unlicensed ISM bands (US: 902–928 MHz, in which the assessed AMI meters 
operate, 2400–2848 MHz, and 5725–5875 MHz). Overall, fewer RF signals were detected indoors 
because of signal attenuation through building walls and windows. 
 
Figure 4: Example of a wide frequency range overview measurement, obtained at in-situ location IS #2 (E-field 
strength was normalized to the maximum field level). 
Next, an example of an in-band overview measurement (also measured at site IS #2) is shown in 
Figure 5. All smart meter configurations assessed in this study used the default 300-kHz channel spacing 
and 83-channel hopping modulation and operated in the ISM 915 MHz band. Figure 5 also shows only 
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a half-occupied AMI frequency band because roughly half of the 83 available frequencies had not been 
used for transmission within the measurement time frame (45 s), as expected from single meters. On the 
other hand, fully-occupied bands were observed in the case of meter banks (not shown here). Finally, 
although the ISM 915 MHz band can be used license-free, it is less occupied than, for instance, the 
unlicensed 2400–2500 MHz band (which includes, for example, nearby Wi-Fi signals and microwave 
radiation). In fact, at none of the measurement locations were RF signals detected from sources other 
than the smart meters in the 915 MHz band. 
 
Figure 5: In-band overview measurement from in-situ location IS #2 (E-field strength was normalized to the 
maximum field level). 
3.2. Spatial measurements 
To assess the worst-case electric-field values near the smart meter configurations, spatial measurements 
were performed. When measuring the electric-field strength as a function of distance (Figure 6; the 
results at 0.3 m are also listed in Table 2), the probe was positioned along the center axis of the specific 
meter configuration. As such, the height of the probe differed between measurement locations (from 
1.2–1.5 m). Moreover, the measuring distance was calculated from the center of the probe to the center 
of the front side of the meter (bank). 
In the case of a single meter, the worst-case exposure levels as a function of distance were very similar, 
with Emax = 10.20–12.79 V/m at 0.3 m (Table 2) and a parallel decrease with distance (Figure 6). While 
the difference in Emax may be caused by deviations in meter output power (e.g. deviations of up to 5 dB 
were found by Tell et al. (2013)) or due to measurement uncertainty of the setup (up to 3 dB), these 
values are in line with those reported by Tell et al. (2013), i.e. 10–18 V/m for residential measurements 
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and < 15 V/m in outdoor laboratory settings at 0.3 m from the assessed meters (which had a nominal 
peak power of 1 W and also operated in the ISM 915 MHz band).  
The meter bank measurements at sites MS #2 (24 smart meters), MS #3 (48 smart meters), IS #3 (46 
smart meters), and IS #5 (combination of 48-meter and 33-meter banks) also resulted in comparable 
Emax (18.40–26.12 V/m at 0.3 m, Table 2), 3–8 dB higher (which corresponds to a two- to seven-fold 
increase in power density) than the single-meter field levels. Significantly higher fields were measured 
at site IS #4 (Emax = 38.32 V/m at 0.3 m, Table 2). This was probably because the 20-meter bank was 
located inside a metal cabinet and the electromagnetic fields were unable to propagate in any direction 
other than through the cabinet opening. Moreover, the isolation of the smart meters might have resulted 
in a more frequent data loss, and thus a higher number of re-transmissions, a higher channel occupation, 
and finally higher measured electric-field values. 
 
Figure 6: Worst-case electric-field strength Emax (in V/m) as a function of distance (in m) to the assessed AMI meter 




Table 2: Worst-case field level (Emax and Smax at 0.3 m), ranges and averages of obtained duty cycles (DCx-min), and 


















Range Avg. Range Avg. 
MS #1 1 10.20 0.276 n.m. 0.15 n.m. 0.15 0.01 0.01 
MS #2 24 23.43 1.456 1.53 – 5.24 2.51 1.94 – 3.23 2.52 1.70 0.78 
MS #3 48 18.40 0.898 4.25 – 7.90 5.62 4.68 – 6.67 5.63 1.58 1.00 
IS #1 1 12.79 0.434 0.007 – 0.07 0.015 0.009 – 0.02 0.015 0.007 0.001 
IS #2 1 12.21 0.396 0.10 – 0.63 0.20 0.15 – 0.29 0.20 0.06 0.02 
IS #3 46 25.08 1.669 1.10 – 4.62 2.41 1.99 – 3.13 2.42 1.71 0.87 
IS #4 20 38.32 3.895 3.97 – 10.89 6.32 4.61 – 8.30 6.34 9.43 5.39 
IS #5 81 26.12 1.810 3.20 – 12.77 6.42 5.25 – 7.58 6.43 5.14 2.29 
Avg. = average. 
The statistical models (one for a single meter, one for a meter bank) of the field strength as a function 
of distance of Eq. (1) resulted in an excellent fit (R2 = 0.95–1.00) and well-replicated electric-field 
strengths at 0.3 m (Tables 2 and 3). As the field strengths from the single meters differed little between 
locations, a model with n = 0.76 (95% confidence interval (CI) = 0.70–0.80) and 
E(d0 = 0.3 m) = 11.72 V/m (95% CI = 10.74–12.76 V/m) (Table 3) can effectively predict the field 
strength as a function of distance to a single smart meter. Meter banks, on the other hand, may exhibit 
significantly different meter configurations (compare for example IS #4 with MS #3). Hence in order to 
predict the electric-field strength as a function of distance to a particular meter bank, it is suggested that 
at least one measurement at a known distance d0 be performed and combined with n = 0.55 (95% 
CI = 0.49–0.62) (the resultant parameter of a model based on combined normalized measurements; last 
row of Table 3). 
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Table 3: Fitted parameters of the model of the (worst-case) electric-field strength (Emax) as a function of the distance 



















 MS #1 0.71 10.00 0.97 
IS #1 0.91 13.58 0.95 
IS #2 0.97 12.27 1.00 











MS #2 (24 meters) 0.54 22.75 0.95 
MS #3 (48 meters) 0.49 22.44 0.95 
IS #3 (46 meters) 0.49 25.18 1.00 
IS #4 (20 meters) 0.58 38.73 1.00 
Meter bank – combined results1 0.55 -- 0.97 
1 The meter bank measurements (excluding those from the 48-meter bank in the meter shop) were normalized to the 
measurement at 0.3 m and fitted to a model with E(d0) = 1 to calculate a combined n. 
At site IS #5, an additional measurement was performed near the center of the room between the two 
panels that can be used to validate the predictive model. The distance to the center of the 33-meter bank 
was 1.60 m and to the center of the 48-meter bank was 1.97 m. The combined predictions, using Eq. (1) 
with n = 0.55 (Table 3) and E(d0 = 0.3 m) of 26.12 V/m (33-meter bank) and 25.96 V/m (48-meter 
bank), resulted in 13.91 V/m, which is close to the actual measured value of 13.75 V/m. 
In addition, at a few sites, a number of measurements were performed at other positions around the 
meter configuration. Based on horizontal and/or vertical increment measurements from the center axis, 
no preferred transmission direction was observed in front of the configuration. (The difference was 
found to be +4 dB to -5.5 dB, when the increment was less than 0.6 m, but no consistency between 
locations was found.) To the back, in addition to the 10 dB attenuation behind the meter due to shielding 
from the metal ‘meter pan’ (Tell et al., 2013), a 15 dB attenuation factor was contributed to a 20-cm 
cinder block wall. And finally, a 13–17 dB  attenuation (i.e. a factor of 20 to 50 lower power density) 
was observed at IS #4 with closed metal panel doors, similar to the 16.6 dB reduction reported by Tell 
et al. (2013) in similar circumstances. 
3.3. Temporal measurements 
Next, long-term (up to 12 hours) single-axis measurements of the power received in the frequency band 
902–928 MHz were performed for all configurations except MS #1, for which a 16-min, single-axis 
measurement was performed. The ranges and average values of the 6-min time-averaged duty cycle 
(DC6-min) for each of the AMI configurations are in Table 2. Figures 6 and 7 show the temporal variation 
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in the 6-min and 30-min average DC of two single meters (IS #1 and IS #2) and three meter banks (MS 
#2, IS #4, and IS #5), respectively. 
 
(a) IS #1 
 
(b) IS #2 




(a) MS #2 (24 meters) 
 
(b) IS #4 (20 meters) 
 
(c) IS #5 (81 meters) 
Figure 8: Temporal measurements of AMI meter banks at (a) MS #2, (b) IS #4, and (c) IS #5. 
Surprisingly, the inter-peak distance of the 6-min average DC was 5 min at both IS #1 and IS #2 
(Figure 7), implying the TI was 5 min instead of the expected 15 min. Moreover, these TI-induced peaks 
were accompanied by two to three times higher peaks at random (IS #1, Figure 7a) or at periodic 
intervals (IS #2, with an inter-peak distance ~ 130 min, Figure 7b). This finding shows the need for 
performing in-situ temporal measurements of AMI as the theoretical DC may differ. 
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Furthermore, the ten-fold difference in DC6-min between the single meters (Figure 7 and Table 2) may be 
explained by their network configurations. The smart meter at IS #1 was a stand-alone meter, directly 
and wirelessly connected to a dedicated access point within the AMI network and with few other AMI 
meters operating nearby, which results in fewer non-readout transmissions. On the other hand, the meter 
at IS #2 operated in a crowded mesh network consisting of AMI meters throughout the neighborhood. 
Hence, the latter situation compared more closely with the meter shop measurements, where DCavg for 
a single meter was 0.15% (with TI = 5 min also) (Table 2). 
At the other in-situ locations, distinct 15-min spaced peaks in DC6-min were observed, which were quite 
variable in peak values (Figure 8b and c). In the meter shop, on the other hand, where TI = 5 min, peaks 
in DC6-min were indeed observed at 5-min intervals for both MS #2 (Figure 8a) and MS #3 (not shown). 
DCs of the latter were roughly twice as high as for the former (Table 2), which also contained half the 
amount of smart meters. 
The DC of the 24-meter bank in the meter shop was similar to the DC of the in-situ 46-meter bank 
(DC6-min,avg ≈ 2.5%; Table 2), while the DCs of the 48-meter bank and the in-situ 81 meter bank were 
roughly twice as high (DC6-min,avg ≈ 5–6%; Table 2). Besides the faster TI in the meter shop, the 
difference in number of meters resulting in similar DCs may be explained by the network architecture 
in which the meters were operating: the meter shop configurations had an unknown number of AMI 
meters being tested independently (and at a sufficient distance) from the measurements. One would 
indeed expect more inter-meter communications in more crowded networks (which was also the case at 
MS #2). This may also (partly) explain the similarity of the DC of the in-situ 20-meter bank with the 
latter pair: in the 33-story apartment building (IS #4), multiple meter banks were installed above and 
below the 5th floor. On top of that, its metal cabinet enclosure may have resulted in a more frequent 
data loss, a higher number of re-transmissions, and thus a higher duty cycle. However, as expected, the 
81-meter configuration resulted both in the highest average and maximum 6-min average duty cycle in 
with DC6-min,max = 12.77% (Table 2). For comparison, a DC of just 0.29% was found by Tell et al. (2013) 
for a 112-meter bank (different vendor, but a similar RF mesh network and also operating within the 
ISM 915 MHz band) using a 3-min zero-span measurement. 
Alternatively, a DC may also be estimated using logs of transmitted data packets (Tell et al., 2012; 
2013), unlike the described method of directly measuring it. This way, Tell et al. (2012, 2013) estimated 
maximum DCs of single meters (from different vendors in a similar RF mesh network and operating 
within the ISM 915 MHz band) of 0.08%, 4.74%, and 13.9%, using different data acquisition techniques, 
and median DCs ranging between 0.01% and 0.06% (although no TI was reported). Moreover, for 
electricity smart meters using ZigBee (IEEE, 2011) and operating at 2.4 GHz, Peyman et al. (2017) 
estimated DCs (also based on data packets) between 0.09% and 1.06%. 
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3.4. Exposure assessment 
Lastly, to compare the study’s results to the ICNIRP and FCC/IEEE maximum permissible exposure 
guidelines (FCC, 1997; ICNIRP, 1998; IEEE, 2005) using the exposure ratio R defined in Eq. (3), the 
maximum time-averaged exposure levels were calculated with Eq. (2) from the worst-case (assuming a 
DC of 100%) electric-field strengths (Emax) and the maximum x-min duty cycles (DCx-min,max with x = 6 
for ICNIRP (1998) and x = 30 for FCC (1997) and IEEE (2005)) obtained per meter configuration. The 
results are listed in Table 2: all time-averaged exposure levels at 0.3 m were well below the ICNIRP and 
FCC/IEEE guidelines. 
For single meters, maximum ICNIRP exposure ratios (RICNIRP,max) of 0.007% to 0.06% were found 
(Table 2). As the field levels at all single-meter locations were similar (Figure 5), the ten-fold higher 
maximum was due to the DC6-min,max of 0.63% obtained at IS #2. For meter banks (with 24 to 81 smart 
meters), RICNIRP,max ranged between 1.58% and 9.43%, with the greatest values due to higher field levels 
and DCs. Averaging the DC over 30 min instead of 6 min allows comparison with the FCC/IEEE 
guidelines (FCC, 1997; IEEE, 2005) (Table 2): FCC/IEEE exposure ratios (RFCC/IEEE) were between 
0.001% (single AMI meter, with a DC30-min,max of 0.02%) and 5.39% (20-meter bank, with a DC30-min,max 
of 8.30%). 
3.4.1. Comparison to other residential RF sources 
To put the RF-EMF exposure to smart meters and smart meter banks in perspective, Figure 9 compares 
their (ICNIRP) exposure ratios to those of a wide range of other household sources of RF-EMF, as 
measured in a previous study (Aerts et al., 2019). At a distance of 0.5 m, the exposure to an Aclara I-
210+cn smart meter (interpolated to this distance via the model of Eq. (1)) is comparable with the 
exposure to wireless access points and cordless phones (RICN ~ 0.001 to 0.01%, Figure 9) and lower than 
the exposure to Belgian electricity meters’ communications modules, which use GPRS (R ~ 0.1%, 
Figure 9). Furthermore, while the RICNIRP comparison of meter banks to household sources can seem 
relatively high, they represent a worst-case scenario. These comparisons do not consider actual use or 
proximity of the source to the user, a strong determinant of exposure. Smart meter(s) (banks) are 
typically installed at locations away from people (for instance in this study: in the basement, attached to 
an exterior wall, and in a metal cabinet in a hallway), which has a large influence on the potential 
exposures. Even given the worst-case scenario nature of these measurements, the RICNIRP of meter banks 




Figure 9: Overview of the range of exposure ratios RICN at 50 cm from a variety of household sources of RF-EMF as 
presented in (Aerts et al., 2019). The ranges found in this study for smart meters and smart meter banks are indicated 
in light grey. (The category “various wireless devices” includes e.g. thermostats, weather stations, and motion sensors.) 
 
3.4.2. Comparison to smart meters using ZigBee at 2.4 GHz 
Furthermore, some types of smart meters (also) operate in the ISM 2.4 GHz band, using ZigBee 
technology with frequencies between 2405 MHz and 2480 MHz (IEEE, 2011). This type of 
communication is prevalent in ‘home area networks’ or HANs, in contrast to the smart meters of this 
study (and of the studies by Foster and Tell (2013) and Tell et al. (2012; 2013)) that operate in mesh 
‘neighborhood area networks’ or NANs. Peyman et al. (2017) investigated a number of smart meters 
that use ZigBee technology at 2.4 GHz (including electricity meters, communications hubs, in-home 
displays, and gas meters) under laboratory conditions and reported maximum power densities at 0.5 m 
between 0.2 mW/m2 and 15 mW/m2 (and a potential outlier of 91 mW/m2). In their follow-up study, 
Calderon et al. (2019) further assessed this type of smart meters (using ZigBee at 2.4 GHz) in 20 homes 
across England. They found peak power densities of approximately 0.1 mW/m2 to 50 mW/m2 (with 
geometric mean 2.02 mW/m2) at 0.5 m for single smart meters and 12.1 mW/m2 at 0.5 m for a meter 
bank of 16 devices, and 6-min duty cycles of respectively 0.01–1.19% and 5.2%. When compared to the 
maximum power densities of 199 mW/m2 (single smart meter) and 2243 mW/m2 (meter bank) 
(interpolated values at 0.5 m, using the model of Eq. (1)) and 6-min duty cycles of respectively 0.007–
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0.63% and 1.53–12.77% (Table 2) measured in this study, it is clear that smart meters operating in HANs 
using ZigBee technology at 2.4 GHz emit much less than devices operating in WANs, which is only 
logical as the former’s range does not have to extend outside of the residence. However, it is important 
to note that even in the case of a HAN, a device (such as a communications hub (Calderon et al., 2019) 
or communications module (Aerts et al., 2019)) will be present that wirelessly communicates the meter 
readings to a WAN gateway (in a NAN) or directly to the utility, in which case it is also part of a ‘wide 
area network’ or WAN. 
3.5. Strengths and limitations 
In-situ assessment of the RF-EMF exposure to single AMI smart meters and multi-meter banks was 
performed in five diverse urban settings in New York City and Westchester County, New York. The 
exposure assessment consisted of measurements reflecting potential worst-case electric-field levels at 
various positions near the smart meter(s) and of the real duty cycle which were combined into the time-
averaged exposure levels, which were then compared to ICNIRP or FCC/IEEE maximum permissible 
exposure guidelines. To the authors’ knowledge, this study was the first time that spatial and temporal 
exposure measurements of smart meters and meter banks were conducted using the spectrogram of a 
spectrum analyzer in zero-span mode instead of frequency mode. 
The advantage of using the SA’s zero-span mode in combination with the spectrogram function for the 
measurements of the worst-case electric-field strength lies in its ability to detect simultaneous emissions 
from multiple meters as higher received power levels (as measured over the entire 902–928 MHz band). 
As simultaneous emissions probably occur in different frequency channels, to avoid packet collisions 
and thus data loss, frequency mode measurements cannot reliably capture the total received power unless 
they are performed extremely fast (faster than was possible with the SA setup of this study). For 
comparison, Tell et al. (2013), who used frequency mode measurements and retained only the “single 
greatest channel value,” reported peak field levels in front of a 112-meter bank that were “essentially no 
different than those in front of individual smart meters,” which was not observed in this study (Figure 5). 
Instead of using estimates based on the log of transmitted data packages (Tell et al., 2012; 2013; Foster 
and Tell, 2013), the actual DC was calculated using long-term measurements of up to 12 h. Furthermore, 
since in-situ measurements are usually constrained by time, alternative methods were explored to derive 
accurate DCs from the short-term spatial measurements (which were also done in zero-span mode). It 
was found that the DCs derived from the spatial measurements lasting 48 min differed relatively little 
from the long-term DCs. In general, 10–25% higher DC6-min,max were obtained from the latter, while the 
largest difference was observed at IS #2 (67% higher), probably due to missing the periodic peaks in 
DC6-min of ~ 0.6% when conducting short-term measurements (Figure 7b). However, in the meter shop, 
where spatial measurements lasted only 16 min due to the smaller TI, the difference in DC increased to 
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up to 120%. Hence, although a dedicated long-term measurement (~ 12 h) remains the best option to 
assess the DC, the spatial short-term measurements offer a decent alternative in case of time constraints. 
Although smart meters operating only in the ISM 915 MHz band (and using frequency-hopping spread 
spectrum) were assessed in this study, the presented measurement procedure may be applied to other 
smart meters or other non-continuous RF sources. However, to obtain accurate measurements for each 
of the three orthogonal electric-field components successively (using the zero-span method), a relatively 
short TI works best, i.e. up to 20 min for a one-hour spatial measurement. Alternatively, in case the TI 
is impracticably long, a single measurement at a known distance from the AMI system would be 
sufficient to calculate the exposure levels at other distances using the model of Eq. (1) and the 
parameters noted in Table 3. 
4.  Conclusions 
Both spatial and temporal radiofrequency (RF) electromagnetic field (EMF) measurements were 
performed near single and aggregations (“banks”) of advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) smart 
meters in a meter shop and in diverse urban settings at five locations. The assessed meters operated in 
the US unlicensed 915 MHz band using frequency-hopping spread spectrum method. The measurements 
consisted of gauging the RF environment, evaluating the worst-case field levels around the AMI meter 
configuration (spatial assessment), and calculating the duty cycle of the configuration, i.e. the fraction 
of time the meter(s) actually transmitted (temporal assessment), after which the latter two measurements 
were combined to obtain time-averaged exposure levels. 
Overall, maximum electric-field levels of 10–13 V/m were obtained for a single meter and 18–38 V/m 
for meter banks (with 20 to 81 meters), while 6-minute averaged duty cycles of 0.01% (one meter) up 
to 13% (81-meter bank divided into two opposite banks) were observed. For all scenarios, the measured 
exposure levels at 0.3 m and beyond were well below reference levels (or maximum permissible 
exposure limits) as issued by the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection 
(ICNIRP, 1998), the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC, 1997), and the Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE, 2005). The worst-case, time-averaged exposure level (at 
0.3 m) amounted to 9.43% of the ICNIRP and 5.39% of FCC/IEEE reference levels. 
Furthermore, two well-fitted prediction models of the peak electric field strength as a function of 
distance were constructed. The single-meter model should be valid for all meters of the considered type, 
whereas for meter banks, at least one field measurement at a known distance may be needed prior to 
using the prediction model. 
Finally, future work entails the evaluation of other AMI smart meters types (using e.g. 4G Narrowband 
(NB) IoT or ZigBee) to examine the general applicability of the presented measurement procedure.  
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